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Pivotality and responsibility attribution in sequential voting

Bartling, Björn; Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2014

This paper analyzes responsibility attributions for outcomes of collective decision making processes. In particular, we ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process. We conduct an experimental voting game in which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272198

The Role of Direct Democracy and Federalism in Local Power

Frey, Bruno S.; Stutzer, Alois - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

Alienation to politics weakens political competition and can undermine the acceptance and legitimacy of democracy as a political system. Governance and representation problems at the local level cause part of citizens’ lack of power and political alienation. Citizens have local power if they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585649

Market experience is a reference point in judgments of fairness

Herz, Holger; Taubinsky, Dmitry - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2013

People's desire for fair transactions can play an important role in negotiations, organizations, and markets. In this paper, we show that markets can also shape what people consider to be a fair transaction. We propose a simple and generally-applicable model of path-dependent fairness...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817279

Reference points in renegotiations: The role of contracts and competition

Schmidt, Klaus M.; Bartling, Björn - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012

effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask … for markups that are 45 percent lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604136

Unique Equilibria in the Rubinstein Bargaining Model when the Payoff Set is Non-Convex

Koehler, Wolfgang F. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2005

bargaining models. The requirements encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payoff sets with discontinuous Pareto … frontiers. The equilibrium of the non-cooperative game is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627955

The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: an empirical investigation

Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom; Aghion, … - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2015

In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011220298

Handing out guns at a knife fight: behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation

Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2014

The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010886157

Maximising Happiness?

Frey, Bruno S.; Stutzer, Alois - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

The measurement of individual happiness challenges the notion that revealed preferences only reliably and empirically reflect individual utility. Reported subjective well-being is a broader concept than traditional decision utility; it also includes concepts like experience and procedural...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627824

Noblesse Oblige? Determinants of Survival in a Life and Death Situation

Frey, Bruno S.; Savage, David A.; Torgler, Benno - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2008

This paper explored the determinants of survival in a life and death situation created by an external and unpredictable shock. We are interested to see whether pro-social behaviour matters in such extreme situations. We therefore focus on the sinking of the RMS Titanic as a quasi-natural...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627900

Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents

Benkert, Jean-Michel - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2015

We study the bilateral trade problem put forward by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) under the assumption that agents are loss-averse. We use the model developed by Kőszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) to find optimal mechanisms for the minimal subsidy, revenue maximization and welfare maximization...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011203011