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Fine Tuning of Health Insurance Regulation: Unhealthy Consequences for an Individual Insurer
Schoder, Johannes; Sennhauser, Michele; Zweifel, Peter - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2009
This paper sheds light on some unexpected consequences of health insurance regulation that may pose a big challenge to insurers’ risk management. Because mandated uniform contributions to health insurance trigger risk selection efforts risk adjustment (RA) schemes become necessary. A good deal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005017517
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Capping Risk Adjustment?
Eugster, Patrick; Sennhauser, Michele; Zweifel, Peter - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2009
When premiums are community-rated, risk adjustment (RA) serves to mitigate competitive insurers’ incentive to select favorable risks. However, unless fully prospective, it also undermines their incentives for efficiency. By capping its volume, one may try to counteract this tendency, exposing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005017519
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Consumer Resistance Against Regulation: The Case of Health Care
Zweifel, Peter; Telser, Harry; Vaterlaus, Stephan - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2005
Regulation fostering Managed Care alternatives in health insurance is spreading. This work reports on an experiment designed to measure the amounts of compensation asked by the Swiss population (in terms of reduced premiums) for Managed-Care type restrictions in the provision of health care. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005700803
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Endogenizing Private Information: Incentive Contracts under Learning By Doing
Gaertner, Dennis - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2004
commitment available to the principal, we show that whether learning effects are over- or under-exploited crucially depends on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005756637
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Monopolistic Screening under Learning By Doing
Gaertner, Dennis - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2007
commitment available to the principal, we show that whether learning effects are over- or under-exploited crucially depends on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005819667
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Co-Payments for Prescription Drugs and the Demand for Doctor Visits - Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Winkelmann, Rainer - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2003
The German health care reform of 1997 provides a natural experiment for evaluating the price sensitivity of demand for physicians’ services. As part of the reform, copayments for prescription drugs were increased by up to 200 percent. However, certain groups of people were exempted from the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005756598
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Health Care Reform and the Number of Doctor Visits – An Econometric Analysis
Winkelmann, Rainer - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2002
The paper evaluates the German health care reform of 1997, using the individual number of doctor visits as outcome measure and data from the German Socio- Economic Panel for the years 1995-1999. A number of modified count data models allow to estimate the effect of the reform in different parts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005756620
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Multiple Losses, Ex-Ante Moral Hazard, and the Non-Optimality of the Standard Insurance Contract
Breuer, Michael - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2003
Under certain conditions the optimal insurance policy will offer full coverage above a deductible, as Arrow and others have shown long time ago. Interestingly, the same design of insurance policies applies in case of a single loss and ex-ante moral hazard. However, many insurance policies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005756584
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Competitive Markets without Commitment
Netzer, Nick; Scheuer, Florian - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2008
sometimes make the commitment problem disappear entirely. In particular, we analyze a model with moral hazard and two-sided lack … of commitment. After agents have chosen a hidden effort and the need to provide incentives has vanished, firms can modify … properties. In addition, we show that equilibrium contracts without commitment are identical to those with full commitment if the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005756642
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Job design and randomization in principal agent models
Köhler, Wolfgang R. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2008
We analyze task allocation and randomization in Principal Agent models. We identify a new rationale that determines the allocation of tasks and show that it can be optimal to assign tasks that are very different to one agent. Similar to randomization, the reason to assign several tasks to one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040816