Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 96
Cover Image
Mechanism design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817273
Cover Image
Optimal grading
Zubrickas, Robertas - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2010
Assuming that teachers are concerned with human capital formation and students - with ability signaling, in this paper we model a teacher-student relationship as an agency problem with conflicting interests. In our model, the teacher elicits effort from the student rewarding for it with a grade,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465168
Cover Image
Optimal design and p-concavity
Ewerhart, Christian - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2009
Some of the most beautiful results in mechanism design depend crucially on Myerson?s (1981) regularity condition. E.g., the second-price auction with reserve price is revenue maximizing only if the type distribution is regular. This paper offers two main results. First, an interpretation of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988914
Cover Image
The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: an empirical investigation
Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom; Aghion, … - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2015
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011220298
Cover Image
How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points?
Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2011
Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)’s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009358972
Cover Image
Use and abuse of authority: A behavioral foundation of the employment relation
Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M.; Bartling, Björn - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012
contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to the realization of the state of the world, but he may also abuse … a strong preference for the employment contract. However, selfish principals exploit agents in one-shot interactions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817249
Cover Image
An envelope approach to tournament design
Ewerhart, Christian - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2014
Optimal rank-order tournaments have traditionally been studied using a first-order approach. The present analysis relies instead on the construction of an "upper envelope" over all incentive compatibility conditions. lt turns out that the first-order approach is not innocuous. For example, in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107243
Cover Image
Reference points in renegotiations: The role of contracts and competition
Schmidt, Klaus M.; Bartling, Björn - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012
initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the … effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to … strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604136
Cover Image
Handing out guns at a knife fight: behavioral limitations of subgame-perfect implementation
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2014
contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010886157
Cover Image
Screening, competition, and job design: economic origins of good jobs
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2010
In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These “high-performance work systems” are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543341