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Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
Cason, Timothy N.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2010
Costless pre-play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games … costly efforts. Allowing intra-group communication leads to more aggressive competition and greater coordination than control … experimental findings from public goods and other coordination games, where communication always enhances efficiency and often …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642476
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Approval of Equal Rights and Gender Differences in Well-Being
Lalive, Rafael; Stutzer, Alois - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
the gender wage gap narrows by one fifth due to an increase by one standard deviation in the approval. Rejecting an … where the gender wage gap is smaller. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627805
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Awards as Incentives
Neckermann, Susanne; Frey, Bruno S. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2008
Non-monetary incentives in the form of awards have so far escaped the attention of economists despite their widespread use. This paper presents an experiment conducted online at IBM to assess the impact of these kinds of extrinsic incentives. Introducing a hypothetical award has statistically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627888
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Mechanism design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817273
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A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments
Schmutzler, Armin - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2006
Many experimental studies implement two versions of one game for which agents’ behavior is fundamentally different even though the Nash prediction is the same. This paper provides a novel explanation of such findings. Starting from the observation that many of the games under consideration...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005756610
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Optimal grading
Zubrickas, Robertas - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2010
Assuming that teachers are concerned with human capital formation and students - with ability signaling, in this paper we model a teacher-student relationship as an agency problem with conflicting interests. In our model, the teacher elicits effort from the student rewarding for it with a grade,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465168
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Heterogeneity, Local Information, and Global Interaction
Berentsen, Aleksander; Bruegger, Esther; Loertscher, Simon - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
Consider a society where all agents initially play "fair" and one agent invents a "cheating" strategy such as doping in sports. Which factors determine the success of the new cheating strategy? In order to study this question we consider an evolutionary game with heterogenous agents who can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005184874
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Establishing Cooperation between Groups: Ingroup versus Outgroup Punishment
Stoff, Christian - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2004
We analyse interethnic cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma when members of one group are unable to target punishment towards individual defectors from the other group. We first show that indiscriminate punishment may sustain cooperation in this setting. Our main result,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005700810
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Markets Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism
Fehr, Ernst; Henrich, Joseph - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
In recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous one-shot encounters with genetically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627903
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The Envious Punisher: Understanding Third and Second Party Punishment with Simple Games
Leibbrandt, Andreas; López-Pérez, Raúl - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2008
We provide a systematic comparison of punishment from unaffected third parties and affected second parties using a within-subject design in ten simple games. We apply the classification analysis by El-Gamal and Grether (1995) and find that a parsimonious model assuming subjects are either...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627932