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Work motivation, institutions, and performance

Gächter, Simon; Falk, Armin - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

In this paper we study experimentally four remedies to overcome inefficiencies that arise from the incompleteness of contracts. These remedies are reciprocity, repeated game effects, social embeddedness, and incentive contracts. In our baseline treatment we find that reciprocity is a powerful...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463514

Fairness in the Labour Market – A Survey of Experimental Results

Gächter, Simon; Fehr, Ernst - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

In this chapter we provide a selective survey of experiments to investigate the potential of social motivations in explaining labour market phenomena. We argue that laboratory experiments are a useful instrument to explore issues in labour market theory and personnel economics. Our starting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463524

Elections and deceptions: an experimental study on the behavioral effects of democracy

Corazzini, Luca; Kube, Sebastian; Maréchal, Michel André - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2009

Traditionally, the virtue of democratic elections has been seen in their role as means of screening and sanctioning shirking public officials. This paper proposes a novel rationale for elections and political campaigns considering that candidates incur psychological costs of lying, in particular...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004969086

The role of bounded rationality and imperfect information in subgame perfect implementation: an empirical investigation

Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; Wilkening, Tom; Aghion, … - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2015

In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011220298

Turning a blind eye, but not the other cheek: on the robustness of costly punishment

Weber, Roberto A.; Xiao, Erte; Kriss, Peter H. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2015

Prior research demonstrates a willingness to incur costs to punish norm violators. But, how strong are the motives underlying such acts? Will people rely on "excuses" to avoid acting on costly punishment intentions, as with other costly pro-social acts? In a laboratory experiment, we find that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011122271

Do markets erode social responsibility?

Bartling, Björn; Weber, Roberto A. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2013

This paper studies the stability of socially responsible behavior in markets. We develop a laboratory product market in which low-cost production creates a negative externality for third parties, but where alternative production with higher costs entirely mitigates the externality. Our data...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240395

The lure of authority: Motivation and incentive effects of power

Fehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger; Wilkening, Tom - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012

Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic life, but empirical knowledge about the motivational origins and consequences of authority is limited. We study the motivation and incentive effects of authority experimentally in an authority-delegation game. Individuals often retain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011240402

What makes voters turn out: the effects of polls and beliefs

Agranov, Marina; Goeree, Jacob K.; Romero, Julian; … - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012

We use laboratory experiments to test for one of the foundations of the rational voter paradigm - that voters respond to probabilities of being pivotal. We exploit a setup that entails stark theoretical effects of information concerning the preference distribution (as revealed through polls) on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817247

Communication in asymmetric group competition over public goods

Zhang, Jingjing - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012

This paper examines whether and how cheap talk communication can facilitate within-group coordination when two unequal sized groups compete for a prize that is shared equally among members of the winning group, regardless of their (costly) contributions to the group’s success. We find that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817248

Designing package markets to eliminate exposure risk

Goeree, Jacob K.; Lindsay, Luke - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012

This paper reports results from a series of laboratory experiments designed to evaluate the impact of exposure risk on … market performance. Exposure risk arises when there are complementarities between trades, e.g. when the purchase of a new … wide variety of settings, performs poorly in a treatment with high exposure risk: overall market efficiency is only 20% and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817251