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Individual Irrationality and Aggregate Outcomes

Fehr, Ernst; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

There is abundant evidence that many individuals violate the rationality assumptions routinely made in economics. However, powerful evidence also indicates that violations of individual rationality do not necessarily refute the aggregate predictions of standard economic models that assume full...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627960

A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments

Schmutzler, Armin - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2006

Many experimental studies implement two versions of one game for which agents’ behavior is fundamentally different even though the Nash prediction is the same. This paper provides a novel explanation of such findings. Starting from the observation that many of the games under consideration...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005756610

Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games

Cason, Timothy N.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2010

. As a result, intra-group communication decreases while inter-group communication increases payoffs. Our experiment thus …Costless pre-play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games … with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest-link contest by expending …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642476

Patents versus Subsidies – A Laboratory Experiment

Darai, Donja; Grosser, Jens; Trhal, Nadja - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2009

price competition. Both stages of the game are implemented in a laboratory experiment and the obtained results support the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005756627

Discrimination and In-group Favoritism in a Citywide Trust Experiment

Falk, Armin; Zehnder, Christian - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2007

This paper provides field experimental evidence on the prevalence and determinants of discrimination and in-group favoritism in trust decisions. We observe choices of about 1,000 inhabitants of the city of Zurich who take part in a sequential trust game, in which first movers can condition their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585631

z-Tree - Experimenter’s Manual

Fischbacher, Urs - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

This manual explains the use of z-Tree, the "Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments". No programming knowledge is necessary to use z-Tree. This software allows to program and to conduct a wide range of experiments. This includes simultaneous and sequential games as well as market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627828

Self-Reinforcing Market Dominance

Halbheer, Daniel; Fehr, Ernst; Goette, Lorenz; … - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2007

Are initial competitive advantages self-reinforcing, so that markets exhibit an endogenous tendency to be dominated by only a few firms? Although this question is of great economic importance, no systematic empirical study has yet addressed it. Therefore, we examine experimentally whether firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005756628

Determinants of Successful Cooperation in a Face-to-Face Social Dilemma

Darai, Donja; Grätz, Silvia - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2010

: The lower the stakes, the more likely players successfully cooperate. Most interestingly, unilateral cooperation is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008466438

Mechanism design and intentions

Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012

We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817273

Markets Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism

Fehr, Ernst; Henrich, Joseph - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627903