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Pivotality and responsibility attribution in sequential voting

Bartling, Björn; Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2014

This paper analyzes responsibility attributions for outcomes of collective decision making processes. In particular, we ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process. We conduct an experimental voting game in which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272198

Redistributive preferences, redistribution, and inequality: Evidence from a panel of OECD countries

Kuhn, Andreas - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2012

This paper describes individuals' inequality perceptions, distributional norms, and redistributive preferences in a … inequality and redistribution. Not surprisingly, the effective level of redistribution (after tax-and-transfer inequality) is … objective dimension of inequality and redistribution are, at least partially, linked with individuals' political preferences and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817293

The Envious Punisher: Understanding Third and Second Party Punishment with Simple Games

Leibbrandt, Andreas; López-Pérez, Raúl - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2008

We provide a systematic comparison of punishment from unaffected third parties and affected second parties using a within-subject design in ten simple games. We apply the classification analysis by El-Gamal and Grether (1995) and find that a parsimonious model assuming subjects are either...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627932

It's all about Connections: Evidence on Network Formation

Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

We present an economic experiment on network formation, in which subjects can decide to form links to one another. Direct links are costly but being connected is valuable. The game-theoretic basis for our experiment is the model of Bala and Goyal (2000). They distinguish between two scenarios...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005760915

Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments

Fehr, Ernst; Gaechter, Simon - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. The more free riders negatively deviate from the group standard the more they are punished. As a consequence, the existence of an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005760920

Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

In this paper we show that a simple model of reciprocal preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585660

Moral Property Rights in Bargaining

Gächter, Simon; Riedl, Arno - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in international conflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers seem to hold strong entitlements that shape negotiations. Despite their importance, the role of entitlements in negotiations has not received much attention. We fill the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627849

Network Experiments

Kosfeld, Michael - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

This paper provides a survey of recent experimental work in eco- nomics focussing on social and economic networks.The experiments consider networks of coordination and cooperation,buyer-seller net- works,and network formation.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627865

The Role of Equality, Efficiency, and Rawlsian Motives in Social Preferences: A Reply to Engelmann and Strobel

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

In a recent paper Engelmann and Strobl claim that a combination of a preference for efficiency and a Rawlsian motive for helping the least well-off is far more important than inequity aversion. Here we show that the relevance of the efficiency motive is largely restricted to students of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627893

Driving Forces of Informal Sanctions

Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …

Informal sanctions are a major determinant of a society's social capital because they are key to the enforcement of implicit agreements and social norms. Yet, little is known about the driving forces behind informal sanctions. We systematically examine the determinants of informal sanctions by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627991

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