We conduct an experiment to investigate (i) whether rotation in voting increases a committee's efficiency, and (ii) the extent to which rotation is likely to critically influence collective and individual welfare. The experiment is based on the idea that voters have to trade-off individual...

This paper addresses two important, but distinct, issues in monetary policy. The first issue concerns regional influences on voting within a monetary policy committee. In a committee that includes representatives from different regions or countries, is there a regional element to the monetary...

Among the most notable, but least discussed, hallmarks of what I have called the "quiet revolution" in central banking practice (Blinder, 2004a) has been the movement toward making monetary policy decisions by committee. Until about a decade ago, most central banks had a single governor, who...

This paper models monetary policy decisions as being taken by an interacting group of heterogeneous policy makers, organized in a MPC. We show that communication between members generally improves the quality of monetary policy by increasing knowledge about uncertain future economic...

We investigate the implications for he setting of interest rates when monetary policy decisions are taken by a committee, in which a subset of members may meet prior to the voting in the commitee and therefore has the possibility to reach consensus ex ante to vote unanimously ex post. We allow...