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In Rubinstein's (1989) E-mail game there exists no Nash equilibrium where players use strategies that condition on the E-mail communication. In this paper I restrict the utilizable information for one player. I show that in contrast to Rubinstein's result, in a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657893
Evidence on behavior of experts in credence goods markets raises an important causality issue: Do "fair prices" induce "good behavior", or do "good experts" post "fair prices"? To answer this question we propose and test a model with three seller types: "the good" choose fair prices and behave...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279266
inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the … has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822832
, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with endogenous prices. We identify heterogeneous distributional preferences … as the main cause and design a parsimonious experiment with exogenous prices that allows classifying experts as either …-standard distributional preferences, among which efficiency-loving and inequality aversion are most frequent. We discuss implications for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550001