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consequences. A principal-agent experiment is studied in which prior to contract choice principals are informed about past actions … mechanism's robustness is explored in further experiments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884174
A simple principal agent problem is experimentally investigated in which a principal repeatedly sets a wage and an agent responds by choosing an effort level. The principal's payoff is determined by the agent's effort. In a first setting the principal can only set a fixed wage in each period. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761948
We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two … agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are … confirmed in a real effort experiment. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762201
experiment. First, a model is analyzed in which two agents simultaneously decide between a risky and a safe strategy and we allow …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822136
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557231