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Public Implementation Eliminates Detrimental Effects of Punishment on Human Cooperation

Xiao, Erte; Houser, Daniel - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

promoting social norms. We show here, using experiments with human subjects, that public implementation of punishment can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822503

The Limits of Self-Governance in the Presence of Spite: Experimental Evidence from Urban and Rural Russia

Gächter, Simon; Herrmann, Benedikt - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

We report evidence from public goods experiments with and without punishment which we conducted in Russia with 566 … because of its long history of collectivism, and a huge urban-rural gap. In contrast to previous experiments we find no …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763774

The Effect of Religion on Cooperation and Altruistic Punishment: Experimental Evidence from Public Goods Experiments

Akay, Alpaslan; Karabulut, Gökhan; Martinsson, Peter - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011

altruistic punishment by using public goods experiments. We conducted the experiments in Turkey at different points in time; one …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009369116

Network Architecture and Mutual Monitoring in Public Goods Experiments

Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Kariv, Shachar; Schotter, Andrew - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment … are allowed. All these experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008693833

Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity

Carpenter, Jeffrey; Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which requires reasonably accurate public information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703699

Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods

Carpenter, Jeffrey P. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004

, regardless of the size or structure of groups. However, experiments show that people will punish free riders, even at …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703051

Group Membership, Competition, and Altruistic versus Antisocial Punishment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Army Groups

Goette, Lorenz; Huffman, David; Meier, Stephan; Sutter, … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

punishment behavior. Our study uses experiments conducted with 525 officers in the Swiss Army, and exploits random assignment to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008680896