Showing 1 - 9 of 9
We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294841
purposes of punishment, deterrence and special prevention. We investigate Bentham’s intuition in a public goods lab experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008633210
coordinate with other teams. We present an experiment with 825 participants, using six different coordination games, where either …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703430
behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980267
rather than weakness. We test and confirm Schelling's conjecture in a simple take-it-or-leave bargaining experiment where the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371183
. We therefore complement the field evidence by a lab experiment that isolates the definitional feature of probation: the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008567631
This high-stakes experiment investigates the effect on buyers of mandatory disclosures concerning an insurance policy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008560393
coordinate with other teams. We present a series of coordination experiments with a total of 1,101 participants. We find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004992853
We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first, i.e. when everyone can be a winner. This type of rank-order competition has the advantage that it can eliminate the negative externality a group's performance imposes on other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005011899