Showing 1 - 10 of 15
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managers farther from the product ("administrative" functions i.e., finance, law, HR) increase with IT investments. Finally, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884351
This paper investigates the effect of different communication channels on promise-making and promise-keeping in a … helping situation. Four treatments differ with respect to the communication channel employed to solicit unincentivized … cooperation, i.e., face-to-face, phone call and two different sorts of computer-mediated communication. The less anonymous (face …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959794
We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test … sustain coordination over time and alleviate the inequality induced by the asymmetry of payoffs. Third, communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011214041
in quantity and quality of output. We use data from a controlled field experiment that changed the communication of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279295
working conditions causes workers to quit at more similar times. When, and only when, communication is allowed, workers are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279313
Team success relies on assigning team members to the right tasks. We use controlled experiments to study how roles are assigned within teams and how this affects team performance. Subjects play the takeover game in pairs consisting of a buyer and a seller. Understanding optimal play is very...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225777
We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703398
In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the true performance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament. According to the standard approach, rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822257