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Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals intermediate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822892
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Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009
behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980267
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Helping in Teams
Danilov, Anastasia; Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
benchmark is tested in an experiment. Furthermore, we provide the first clean one-shot experimental test of the Lazear and Rosen … (1981) tournament model. In a second experiment, we investigate the effectiveness of corporate value statements to encourage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011105057
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Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution: An Experimental Investigation
Berger, Johannes; Harbring, Christine; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557231