in a tournament, but increase individual and total output. If the tournament is optimally designed, welfare is higher if …

assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that …

high-prize tournament, while low-ability agents compete for the low prize. However, there are also equilibria in which … agents follow a mixed strategy and there can be reverse sorting, i.e. low-ability agents are in the tournament with the high … prize, while high-ability agents are in the low-prize tournament. We show that total effort always decreases compared to a …

We empirically model performance in the final round of a multiple-round tournament as a spatially autoregressive …

. We show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament, the average effort is higher and the between …

such doping or cheating within a tournament game between two heterogeneous players. Three major effects are identified …