interaction effects. We conduct an experiment that avoids the identification problem present in the field. Our novel design …

We provide a direct test of the role of social preferences in voluntary cooperation. We elicit individuals' cooperation … preference in one experiment and make a point prediction about the contribution to a repeated public good. This allows for a … novel test as to whether there are "types" of players who behave consistently with their elicited preferences. We find clear …

theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators’ punishment is almost exclusively targeted … towards the defectors but the latter also impose a considerable amount of spiteful punishment on the cooperators. However …, spiteful punishment vanishes if the punishers can no longer affect the payoff differences between themselves and the punished …

representative behavioral data from a social dilemma experiment. We identify which survey questions intended to elicit people's trust … correlate well with behaviorally exhibited trust in the experiment. People above the age of 65, highly skilled workers and …