experiment based on a game in the first stage of which subjects can voluntarily contribute to the funding of a collective good …

punishment, so that they increase overall welfare? We report an experiment in which players can issue non-binding threats to … their actual punishment level. We find that threats increase the level of contributions significantly. Efficiency is … punishment leads to lower threats, cooperation and welfare, restoring them to levels equal to or below the levels attained in the …

bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all …

experiment reproduces this model in the laboratory by means of various treatments in which we alter the variance of the …

We study the impact of communication on behavior in a two-stage coordination game with asymmetric payoffs. We test …

paper reports the results of a real-effort experiment in which participants choose between an individual compensation scheme …

-exchange experiment, the employer can express respect by giving the employee costly symbolic rewards after observing his level of effort …. This experiment sheds light on the extent to which symbolic rewards are used, how they affect employees’ further effort …