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Masella, Paolo; Meier, Stephan; Zahn, Philipp - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

This paper investigates in a principal-agent environment whether and how group membership influences the effectiveness of incentives and when incentives can have “hidden costs”, i.e., a detrimental effect. We show experimentally that in all interactions control mechanisms can have hidden...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011252294

A Nation-Wide Laboratory: Examining Trust and Trustworthiness by Integrating Behavioral Experiments into Representative Surveys

Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; von Rosenbladt, Bernhard; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2003

representative behavioral data from a social dilemma experiment. We identify which survey questions intended to elicit people's trust … correlate well with behaviorally exhibited trust in the experiment. People above the age of 65, highly skilled workers and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761956

Donations, Risk Attitudes and Time Preferences: A Study on Altruism in Primary School Children

Angerer, Silvia; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

We study with a sample of 1,070 primary school children, aged seven to eleven years, how altruism in a donation … experiment is related to children's risk attitudes and intertemporal choices. Examining such a relationship is motivated by … theories of reciprocal altruism that provide a cornerstone to understand human social behavior. We find that higher risk …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011086478

Performance Pay, Group Selection and Group Performance

Königstein, Manfred; Ruchala, Gabriele K. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

Within a laboratory experiment we investigate a principal-agent game in which agents may, first, self-select into a … in work groups. The selection effect is larger than the motivation effect. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822552

Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution: An Experimental Investigation

Berger, Johannes; Harbring, Christine; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557231

Voluntary Contributions to the Establishment and Operation of Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Arbel, Yuval; Bar-El, Ronen; Schwarz, Mordechai E.; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

We study the dynamics of the private provision of a public good that requires both capacity buildup and ongoing operating costs. We show that setting a time limit for the collection of contributions dedicated to capacity buildup minimizes the utility loss at the Nash equilibrium. We test the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959541

The Effect of Religion on Cooperation and Altruistic Punishment: Experimental Evidence from Public Goods Experiments

Akay, Alpaslan; Karabulut, Gökhan; Martinsson, Peter - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011

This paper experimentally examines how religious festivals and the degree of religiosity affect cooperation and altruistic punishment by using public goods experiments. We conducted the experiments in Turkey at different points in time; one on the most religious day during Ramadan (the Night of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009369116

Everyone is a Winner: Promoting Cooperation through All-Can-Win Intergroup Competition

Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first, i.e. when everyone can be a winner. This type of rank-order competition has the advantage that it can eliminate the negative externality a group's performance imposes on other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005011899

Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods

Carpenter, Jeffrey P. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004

Because costly punishment is not credible, subgame perfection suggests that punishment will not deter free riding, regardless of the size or structure of groups. However, experiments show that people will punish free riders, even at considerable cost. To examine the implications of agents who...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703051

Ambiguity on Audits and Cooperation in a Public Goods Game

Dai, Zhixin; Hogarth, Robin M.; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

We investigate the impact of various audit schemes on the future provision of public goods, when contributing less than the average of the group is sanctioned exogenously and the probability of an audit is unknown. We study how individuals update their beliefs about the probability of being...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010739419

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