willingness of some team members to engage in the costly punishment of shirkers. This alternative does not require small group …

-effort experiment based on this model. Consistent with a behavioral approach to public finance, we find that tournament workers are less …

heterogeneous groups. When punishment is not allowed all groups converge towards free-riding. With punishment, contributions … that these differences are not accidental but enforced by punishment. The enforced contribution norms are related to …

punishment, so that they increase overall welfare? We report an experiment in which players can issue non-binding threats to … their actual punishment level. We find that threats increase the level of contributions significantly. Efficiency is … punishment leads to lower threats, cooperation and welfare, restoring them to levels equal to or below the levels attained in the …

Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment … are allowed. All these experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and …

experiment randomly assigning participants to four raffle treatments to examine the effectiveness of alternative incentive … revenue gains are available on both margins. Our experiment, and others like it, illustrates the power of field experiments to …

altruism. Instead, we posit that social reciprocity is a triggered normative response. Our experiment confirms the existence of …. To provide theoretical foundations for social reciprocity, we show that generalized punishment norms survive in one of …

temporary contract, while others are permanent members of the same team. In a laboratory experiment we analyze the cooperation …