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Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort
Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a “good” allocation of effort across …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566602
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Resource Allocation and Firm Scope
Friebel, Guido; Raith, Michael - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with nonintegration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … division managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761852
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Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment
Rosaz, Julie; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers’ performance to the experimenter. The report is non verifiable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225776
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Testing Canonical Tournament Theory: On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Wu, Steven Y. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646321
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Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design
Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727777
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Division of Labour and Directed Production
Ratto, Marisa; Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005
We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822445
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Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns
Koch, Alexander K.; Peyrache, Eloïc - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005
of information to future employers and sharpen incentives. Using a simple moral hazard model, we demonstrate that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005700845
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On the Prudence of Rewarding A While Hoping for B
Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2003
In multiple-task hidden-action models, the (mis-)allocation of effort may play an important role for benefit creation. Signals which capture this benefit and which are used in incentive schemes should thus not only be judged by the noise and the associated costs but also by the mis-allocation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761834
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Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent Is Free to Leave
Englmaier, Florian; Muehlheusser, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557227
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A Field Experiment in Motivating Employee Ideas
Gibbs, Michael; Neckermann, Susanne; Siemroth, Christoph - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
We study the effects of a field experiment designed to motivate employee ideas, at a large technology company. Employees were encouraged to submit ideas on process and product improvements via an online system. In the experiment, the company randomized 19 account teams into treatment and control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884106