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leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with nonintegration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … division managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761852
The 'ratchet effect' refers to a situation where a principal uses private information that is revealed by an agent's early actions to the agent's later disadvantage, in a context where binding multi-period contracts are not enforceable. In a simple, context-rich environment, we experimentally...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233858
less exposed to moral hazard risk, face more powerful performance incentives, and are more productive. Under-consumption of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703622
This paper offers a rationale for limiting the delegation of (real) authority, which neither relies on insurance arguments nor depends on ownership structure. We analyse a repeated hidden action model in which the actions of a risk neutral agent determine his future outside option. Consequently,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703716
: selfish workers who only respond to monetary incentives, and conditionally cooperative workers who might voluntarily provide …-select into firms that differ in their incentives as well as their resulting level of team work. Our model can explain why firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703792
We explore the optimal delegation of decision rights by a principal to a better informed but biased agent. In an infinitely repeated game a long lived principal faces a series of short lived agents. Every period they play a cheap talk game ala Crawford and Sobel (1982) with constant bias,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822204
The present paper aims to contribute to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts by providing conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We consider a hold-up framework where both parties profit from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566762
and Moore still hold. It is shown that investment incentives are guided by an additional element to standard hold … overinvestment. Although investment incentives are always positive from a social perspective, they can be negative from an individual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762029
This paper contrasts the determinants of entrepreneurial entry and high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship. Using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) surveys for 42 countries over the period 1998-2005, we analyse how institutional environment and entrepreneurial characteristics affect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015496
from offering their employees adequate incentives to perform the appropriate mix of tasks. The paper also shows how …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703276