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Job Protection, Minimum Wage and Unemployment

Cahuc, Pierre; Zylberberg, André - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 1999

high redundancy transfers influence employment. Moreover, the assumption of renegotiation by mutual agreement allows us to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762387

How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?

Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011

such as informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. We investigate the relevance of these features experimentally. Our … the presence of informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. However, our data also reveal new behavioral features that … renegotiation changes how trading parties evaluate ex post outcomes. Interestingly, the availability of these additional options …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371874

Redundancy Payments, Incomplete Labor Contracts, Unemployment and Welfare

Cahuc, Pierre; Zylberberg, André - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 1999

It is frequently argued that pure government-mandated severance transfers by the employer to the worker have neither employment nor welfare effect because they can be offset by private transfers from the worker to the employer. In this paper, using a dynamic search and matching model à la...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703431

Experimental Labor Markets and Policy Considerations: Incomplete Contracts and Macroeconomic Aspects

Casoria, Fortuna; Riedl, Arno - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

This survey focuses on experimental labor markets investigating two aspects that deem us important for a better understanding of labor market relations and the consequences for labor market policies. The first part of the survey is dedicated to papers that assess the prevalence of reciprocal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884075

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation

Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2015

In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265296

Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts

MacLeod, W. Bentley - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233793

Construction Contracts (or: "How to Get the Right Building at the Right Price?")

Chakravarty, Surajeet; MacLeod, W. Bentley - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

Most contracts that individuals enter into are not written from scratch; rather, they depend upon forms and terms that have been successful in the past. In this paper, we study the structure of form construction contracts published by the American Institute of Architects (AIA). We show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233914

Reciprocity and Payment Schemes: When Equality Is Unfair

Abeler, Johannes; Altmann, Steffen; Kube, Sebastian; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

A growing literature stresses the importance of reciprocity, especially for employment relations. In this paper, we study the interaction of different payment modes with reciprocity. In particular, we analyze how equal wages affect performance and efficiency in an environment characterized by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761926

Contracting with Private Information

Hagedorn, Marcus - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2003

This paper adds to the current literature on incomplete contracting that argues that deviating from a complete information, transaction-cost free environment may be may generate valuable insights. We achieve this by assuming bargaining with asymmetric information. We consider the consequences of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762029

Discretionary Latitude and Relational Contracting

Wu, Steven Y.; Roe, Brian E. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

We use economic experiments to examine the nature of relational trading under a menu of incomplete contracts ranging from the repeat purchase mechanism of Klein and Leffler (1981) to highly incomplete contracts that are completely unenforceable by third-parties. Our results suggest that, with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762063