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Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009
the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages, which mitigates the sabotage problem …Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical data on induced sabotage … behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980267
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Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment
Carpenter, Jeffrey; Matthews, Peter Hans; Schirm, John - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007
In many environments, tournaments can elicit more effort from workers, except perhaps when workers can sabotage each … the incentive effect of tournaments is thin. There is even less evidence on the impact of sabotage because real world acts … of sabotage are often subtle manifestations of subjective peer evaluation or "office politics." We discuss a real effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703722
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Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less Effort? Incentive Reversal in Teams
Klor, Esteban F.; Kube, Sebastian; Winter, Eyal; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
Conventional wisdom suggests that an increase in monetary incentives should induce agents to exert higher effort. In this paper, however, we demonstrate that this may not hold in team settings. In the context of sequential team production with positive externalities between agents, incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008839289
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Reciprocity and Payment Schemes: When Equality Is Unfair
Abeler, Johannes; Altmann, Steffen; Kube, Sebastian; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
A growing literature stresses the importance of reciprocity, especially for employment relations. In this paper, we study the interaction of different payment modes with reciprocity. In particular, we analyze how equal wages affect performance and efficiency in an environment characterized by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761926
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Women and Competition in Elimination Tournaments: Evidence from Professional Tennis Data
Lallemand, Thierry; Plasman, Robert; Rycx, François - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005
for many tournament and player characteristics. Further results indicate that uneven contests lead favourites to win more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566466
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Treating Equals Unequally: Incentives in Teams, Workers' Motivation and Production Technology
Goerg, Sebastian; Kube, Sebastian; Zultan, Ro'i - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009
The importance of fair and equal treatment of workers is at the heart of the debate in organizational management. In this regard, we study how reward mechanisms and production technologies affect effort provision in teams. Our experimental results demonstrate that unequal rewards can potentially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566518
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Potential, Prizes and Performance: Testing Tournament Theory with Professional Tennis Data
Sunde, Uwe - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2003
This paper tests two hypotheses from the theory of elimination tournaments: (i) that uneven tournaments, where the contestants are ex ante heterogeneous, entail lower effort exertion; this is a prediction from agency theory that has not been tested empirically before; and (ii) whether incentives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233835
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Incentive Effects of Bonus Payments: Evidence from an International Company
Engellandt, Axel; Riphahn, Regina T. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
This study uses panel data describing about 6,500 employees in a large international company to study the incentive effects of performance related pay. The company uses two performance related remuneration mechanisms. One is an individual "surprise" bonus payment. The other is a more structured...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703318
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Gift Exchange in the Workplace: Money or Attention?
Dur, Robert - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822723
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Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection
Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
Tournament incentive schemes offer payments dependent on relative performance and thereby are intended to motivate … competitors in order to improve the own relative position. In the present study we investigate whether this sabotage problem is … mitigated in a repeated interaction between the agents and the principal. As sabotage can hardly be observed in real …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566800