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What Happens When Employers are Free to Discriminate? Evidence from the English Barclays Premier Fantasy Football League
Bryson, Alex; Chevalier, Arnaud - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
have focused on the intention to hire. Instead, we rely on a virtual labour market, the Fantasy Football Premier League …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959773
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Ten Do It Better, Do They? An Empirical Analysis of an Old Football Myth
Caliendo, Marco; Radic, Dubravko - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
In this paper we investigate how the expulsion of a player influences the outcome of a football match. Common sense … implies a negative impact for the affected team. However, an old football myth suggests that such an expulsion might also be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762276
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Country-Specific Goal-Scoring in the "Dying Seconds" of International Football Matches
Ours, Jan C. van; Tuijl, Martin A. van - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
important international football matches. We examine goal-scoring from 1960 onwards in full 'A' international matches of six … national teams: Belgium, Brazil, England, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. We analyze qualifying matches for the European … Cup. We find that the national teams of Germany, England and the Netherlands are more likely than the three other national …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568300
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Performance Pay, Group Selection and Group Performance
Königstein, Manfred; Ruchala, Gabriele K. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007
in work groups. The selection effect is larger than the motivation effect. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822552
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Incentives and Group Identity
Masella, Paolo; Meier, Stephan; Zahn, Philipp - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
This paper investigates in a principal-agent environment whether and how group membership influences the effectiveness of incentives and when incentives can have “hidden costs”, i.e., a detrimental effect. We show experimentally that in all interactions control mechanisms can have hidden...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011252294
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Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters!
Fedele, Alessandro; Naticchioni, Paolo - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013
In this paper we study optimal choices of self-selection into politics and commitment once in office on the part of citizens with heterogeneous abilities and heterogeneous motivations. Politicians can moonlight, i.e., they can work in the market sector while appointed in parliament. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011163471
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Laws and Norms
Benabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
This paper analyzes how private decisions and public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences ("values"), material or other explicit incentives ("laws") and social sanctions or rewards ("norms"). It first examines how honor, stigma and social norms arise from individuals'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646323
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Pro-Social Missions and Worker Motivation: An Experimental Study
Fehrler, Sebastian; Kosfeld, Michael - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
mission-oriented organizations is important to explain empirical findings of lower wages and high motivation in the latter. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279260
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Commitment to Self-Rewards
Koch, Alexander K.; Nafziger, Julia - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009
Self-administered rewards are ubiquitous. They serve as incentives for personal accomplish¬ments and are widely recommended as tools for overcoming self-control problems. However, it seems puzzling why self-rewards can work: the prospect of a reward has a motivating force only if the threat of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004999154
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Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control
Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
the agent’s motivation to perform well. Before the agent chooses his performance, the principal in our experiment decides …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762323