Showing 1 - 10 of 47
In public good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of its members find it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, their inherent asymmetric nature may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informal sanctioning harder to accomplish....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761712
This paper demonstrates the effects of ethnic and religious diversity on the quality of public spaces. Its identification strategy relies on the exogeneity of public housing allocations in France, and thereby eliminates the bias from endogenous sorting. The paper uses micro evidence of social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009353428
Labor Market Intermediaries (LMIs) are entities or institutions that interpose themselves between workers and firms to facilitate, inform, or regulate how workers are matched to firms, how work is accomplished, and how conflicts are resolved. This paper offers a conceptual foundation for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822049
Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems … mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this paper we explore the boundary conditions for altruistic punishment to … maintain cooperation by systematically varying the cost and impact of punishment, using a subject pool which extends beyond the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822636
hierarchy – the caste system – affects individuals' willingness to punish violations of a cooperation norm. Although we control …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976904
A large and growing literature links high levels of ethnic diversity to low levels of public goods provision. Yet while the empirical connection between ethnic heterogeneity and the underprovision of public goods is widely accepted, there is little consensus on the specific mechanisms through...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005700854
We introduce three variations of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959704
We argue that anti-corruption laws may provide an efficiency rationale for why political parties should meddle in the distribution of political nominations and government contracts. Anticorruption laws forbid trade in spoils that politicians distribute. However, citizens may pay for gaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233818
We estimate the effect of legislative term limits on various categories of state government spending using the most recent panel of 47 states from 1972 to 2005. Besides the usual economic, political, fiscal and demographic factors, we also control for the state tax and expenditure limitations....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010541275
This paper analyzes the determinants of local institutions and distribution of political power within a constant 'macro-institutional' setting. We show that characteristics of Brazilian municipalities related to institutional quality and distribution of political power are partly inherited from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005039651