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Muriel, Alastair; Smith, Jeffrey A. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011

Quantitative school performance measures (QPMs) are playing an ever larger role in education systems on both sides of the Atlantic. In this paper we outline the rationale for the use of such measures in education, review the literature relating to several important problems associated with their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009220623

Performance Measure Properties and Incentives

Gibbs, Michael; Merchant, Kenneth A.; Stede, Wim A. Van der - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004

for auto dealership managers. The data include information on five properties: two indicators of risk; two indicators of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762158

Benchmarking Regions: Estimating the Counterfactual Distribution of Labor Market Outcomes

Fitzenberger, Bernd; Furdas, Marina - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

This paper develops and implements a new benchmarking approach for labor market regions. Based on panel data for regions, we use nonparametric matching techniques to account for observed labor market characteristics and for spatial proximity. As the benchmark, we estimate the counterfactual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279231

The Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field Experiment

Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Verbeke, Willem - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

We conduct a natural field experiment in a large retail chain to test basic predictions of tournament theory regarding prize spread and noise. A random subset of the 208 stores participates in two-stage elimination tournaments. Tournaments differ in the distribution of prize money across winners...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279320

Design and Implementation of Pay for Performance

Gibbs, Michael - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

A large, mature and robust economic literature on pay for performance now exists, which provides a useful framework for thinking about pay for performance systems. I use the lessons of the literature to discuss how to design and implement pay for performance in practice.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646325

On the Sorting of Physicians across Medical Occupations

Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

less exposed to moral hazard risk, face more powerful performance incentives, and are more productive. Under-consumption of … health services relative to the first best allocation increases with occupational (moral hazard) risk. Occupations with risk … health care services offered, the differential impact of malpractice risk across occupations, and the recent growth in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703622

The Benefits of Being Economics Professor A (and not Z)

Praag, C. Mirjam van; Praag, Bernard M.S. van - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

Alphabetic name ordering on multi-authored academic papers, which is the convention in the economics discipline and various other disciplines, is to the advantage of people whose last name initials are placed early in the alphabet. As it turns out, Professor A, who has been a first author more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763784

Curbing Cream-Skimming: Evidence on Enrolment Incentives

Courty, Pascal; Kim, Do Han; Marschke, Gerald - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

Can enrolment incentives reduce the incidence of cream-skimming in the delivery of public sector services (e.g. education, health, job training)? In the context of a large government job training program, we investigate whether the use of enrolment incentives that set different 'shadow prices'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566402

Performance Measurement, Expectancy and Agency Theory: An Experimental Study

Praag, Mirjam van; Sloof, Randolph - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent’s optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure. In contrast,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761969

Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution: An Experimental Investigation

Berger, Johannes; Harbring, Christine; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors were not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557231