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The Good, the Bad and the Naive: Do Fair Prices Signal Good Types or Do They Induce Good Behaviour?

Dulleck, Uwe; Johnston, David W.; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

Evidence on behavior of experts in credence goods markets raises an important causality issue: Do "fair prices" induce … "good behavior", or do "good experts" post "fair prices"? To answer this question we propose and test a model with three … selection and fixed effects regressions support the model's predictions and show that causality goes from good experts to fair …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279266

Guilt from Promise-Breaking and Trust in Markets for Expert Services: Theory and Experiment

Beck, Adrian; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Qiu, Jianying; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

to a consumer first, whereupon the consumer can express her trust by paying an interaction price before the expert’s … provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert’s promise induces a commitment that triggers guilt if the promise is … experts make the predicted promise; (2) proper promises induce consumer-friendly behavior; and (3) higher interaction prices …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008529143

Identity Changes and the Efficiency of Reputation Systems

Wibral, Matthias - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

Reputation systems aim to induce honest behavior in online trade by providing information about past conduct of users …. Online reputation, however, is not directly connected to a person, but only to the virtual identity of that person. Users can … therefore shed a negative reputation by creating a new account. We study the effects of such identity changes on the efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884234

Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts

MacLeod, W. Bentley - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233793

Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations

Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2003

The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals’ payoffs are determined by a random component. It is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233886

Laws and Norms

Benabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

This paper analyzes how private decisions and public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences ("values"), material or other explicit incentives ("laws") and social sanctions or rewards ("norms"). It first examines how honor, stigma and social norms arise from individuals'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646323

Dynamic Incentive Contracts under Parameter Uncertainty

Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing the productivity of the relationship, and featuring a hidden action for the agent. We develop an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and noise are normally distributed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727782

Coordination under the Shadow of Career Concerns

Koch, Alexander K.; Morgenstern, Albrecht - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

To innovate, employees need to develop novel ideas and coordinate with each other to turn these ideas into better products and services. Work outcomes provide signals about employees' abilities to the labor market, and therefore career concerns arise. These can both be 'good' (enhancing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761666

Incentives, Decision Frames, and Motivation Crowding Out - An Experimental Investigation

Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

A simple principal agent problem is experimentally investigated in which a principal repeatedly sets a wage and an agent responds by choosing an effort level. The principal's payoff is determined by the agent's effort. In a first setting the principal can only set a fixed wage in each period. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761948

Why Volunteer? Evidence on the Role of Altruism, Reputation, and Incentives

Carpenter, Jeffrey; Myers, Caitlin Knowles - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

explanations, we find that altruism and reputational concerns are positively associated with the decision to volunteer. Moreover …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762134