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Kornhauser, Lewis A.; MacLeod, W. Bentley - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

Contract law and the economics of contract have, for the most part, developed independently of each other. In this … essay, we briefly review the notion of a contract from the perspective of lawyer, and then use this framework to organize … the economics literature on contract. The title, Contracts between Legal Persons, limits the review to that part of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008765228

Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts

MacLeod, W. Bentley - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

incomplete contract. It is shown that the efficiency of these solutions is very sensitive to the characteristics of the good or …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233793

Optimal Incentive Contracts under Inequity Aversion

Englmaier, Florian; Wambach, Achim - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566722

Construction Contracts (or: "How to Get the Right Building at the Right Price?")

Chakravarty, Surajeet; MacLeod, W. Bentley - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

example of how markets, as opposed to private negotiations, can be used to determine efficient contract terms. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233914

Equity and Efficiency in Multi-Worker Firms: Insights from Experimental Economics

Abeler, Johannes; Altmann, Steffen; Goerg, Sebastian; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011

In this paper, we discuss recent evidence from economic experiments that study the impact of social preferences on workplace behavior. We focus on situations in which a single employer interacts with multiple employees. Traditionally, equity and efficiency have been seen as opposing aims in such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024592

The Roles of Incentives and Voluntary Cooperation for Contractual Compliance

Gächter, Simon; Kessler, Esther; Königstein, Manfred - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011

Efficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self-regarding incentives for contractual compliance are present as well. Here we provide a comprehensive experimental analysis based on the gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009149162

Communication and Trust in Principal-Team Relationships: Experimental Evidence

Kleine, Marco; Kube, Sebastian - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2015

gift exchange as a contract-enforcement device for work teams. Our findings suggest that the use of such self …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011125865

Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation

Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms – which are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010891173

Experimental Labor Markets and Policy Considerations: Incomplete Contracts and Macroeconomic Aspects

Casoria, Fortuna; Riedl, Arno - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

This survey focuses on experimental labor markets investigating two aspects that deem us important for a better understanding of labor market relations and the consequences for labor market policies. The first part of the survey is dedicated to papers that assess the prevalence of reciprocal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884075

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation

Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2015

In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling in practice, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265296