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Cooperation in Diverse Teams: The Role of Temporary Group Membership
Grund, Christian; Harbring, Christine; Thommes, Kirsten - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2015
temporary contract, while others are permanent members of the same team. In a laboratory experiment we analyze the cooperation …In organizations, some team members are assigned to a team for a predefined short period of time, e.g., as they have a … levels resulting from diverse teams, where some team members remain with a team and others are switching teams. Our results …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011125872
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Network Architecture and Mutual Monitoring in Public Goods Experiments
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Kariv, Shachar; Schotter, Andrew - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
Recent experiments show that public goods can be provided at high levels when mutual monitoring and costly punishment are allowed. All these experiments, however, study monitoring and punishment in a setting where all agents can monitor and punish each other (i.e., in a complete network). The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008693833
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Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity
Carpenter, Jeffrey; Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
requires reasonably accurate public information concerning the behavior of each player. We provide a model of team production … willingness of some team members to engage in the costly punishment of shirkers. This alternative does not require small group …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703699
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Social Reciprocity
Carpenter, Jeffrey; Matthews, Peter Hans - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
altruism. Instead, we posit that social reciprocity is a triggered normative response. Our experiment confirms the existence of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823004
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Threat and Punishment in Public Good Experiments
Masclet, David; Noussair, Charles N.; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
punishment, so that they increase overall welfare? We report an experiment in which players can issue non-binding threats to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008678693
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Voluntary Contributions to the Establishment and Operation of Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Arbel, Yuval; Bar-El, Ronen; Schwarz, Mordechai E.; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
We study the dynamics of the private provision of a public good that requires both capacity buildup and ongoing operating costs. We show that setting a time limit for the collection of contributions dedicated to capacity buildup minimizes the utility loss at the Nash equilibrium. We test the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959541
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The Effect of Religion on Cooperation and Altruistic Punishment: Experimental Evidence from Public Goods Experiments
Akay, Alpaslan; Karabulut, Gökhan; Martinsson, Peter - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
This paper experimentally examines how religious festivals and the degree of religiosity affect cooperation and altruistic punishment by using public goods experiments. We conducted the experiments in Turkey at different points in time; one on the most religious day during Ramadan (the Night of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009369116
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Everyone is a Winner: Promoting Cooperation through All-Can-Win Intergroup Competition
Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009
We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first, i.e. when everyone can be a winner. This type of rank-order competition has the advantage that it can eliminate the negative externality a group's performance imposes on other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005011899
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Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods
Carpenter, Jeffrey P. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
Because costly punishment is not credible, subgame perfection suggests that punishment will not deter free riding, regardless of the size or structure of groups. However, experiments show that people will punish free riders, even at considerable cost. To examine the implications of agents who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703051
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Ambiguity on Audits and Cooperation in a Public Goods Game
Dai, Zhixin; Hogarth, Robin M.; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
We investigate the impact of various audit schemes on the future provision of public goods, when contributing less than the average of the group is sanctioned exogenously and the probability of an audit is unknown. We study how individuals update their beliefs about the probability of being...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010739419