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Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence
Danilov, Anastasia; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013
We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. A principal-agent experiment is studied in which prior to contract choice principals are informed about past actions of other agents and thus have more information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884174
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Ingratiation and Favoritism: Experimental Evidence
Robin, Stéphane; Rusinowska, Agnieszka; Villeval, … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
We provide experimental evidence of workers' ingratiation by opinion conformity and of managers' discrimination in favor of workers with whom they share similar opinions. In our Baseline, managers can observe both workers' performance at a task and opinions before assigning unequal payoffs. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279287
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The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation
Aghion, Philippe; Fehr, Ernst; Holden, Richard; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2015
mechanism should – in theory – provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265296
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Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts
MacLeod, W. Bentley - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233793
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Testing Canonical Tournament Theory: On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Wu, Steven Y. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal … tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an incentive effect from raising the winner's prize. However, we also … observed several empirical puzzles that appeared to contradict theory. Controlling for social preferences did not resolve the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646321
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Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design
Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727777
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Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking
Benabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013
This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635587
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Risk, Delegation, and Project Scope
Roider, Andreas - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007
This paper studies a partial-contracting model where an agent may provide effort to increase a project’s scope before some later decisions have to be taken. Consistent with existing empirical evidence, we find a positive relationship between exogenous risk and delegation. That is, we show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703275
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Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments
Kräkel, Matthias; Schöttner, Anja - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
Several empirical studies have challenged tournament theory by pointing out that (1) there is considerable pay …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822027
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Gift Exchange in the Workplace: Money or Attention?
Dur, Robert - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822723