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Negative Externalities and Equilibrium Existence in Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection

von Siemens, Ferdinand; Kosfeld, Michael - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

on existing theories of competition in markets with adverse selection. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976877

Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

Benabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013

This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of … compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most … perfect competition, the resulting efficiency loss can be much larger than that imposed by a single firm or principal, who …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635587

Testing Canonical Tournament Theory: On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure

Sheremeta, Roman M.; Wu, Steven Y. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646321

Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design

Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727777

Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments

Kräkel, Matthias; Schöttner, Anja - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

Several empirical studies have challenged tournament theory by pointing out that (1) there is considerable pay variation within hierarchy levels, (2) promotion premiums only in part explain hierarchical wage differences and (3) external recruitment is observable on nearly any hierarchy level. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822027

Worker Self-Selection and the Profits from Cooperation

Kosfeld, Michael; von Siemens, Ferdinand - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

We investigate a competitive labor market with team production. Workers differ in their motivation to exert team effort and types are private information. We show that there can exist a separating equilibrium in which workers self-select into different firms and firms employing cooperative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822981

Producer Protection Legislation and Termination Damages in the Presence of Contracting Frictions

Wu, Steven Y. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

This study models producer protection legislation that would grant growers the right to claim damages (PPLD) if their contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes, PPLD...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005103260

Search and Retirement under Asymmetric Information

Bi, Sheng; Langot, François - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

We consider a labor market where the competitive search equilibrium is inefficient due to asymmetrical information. At the time when firms commit to specific hiring costs, workers hold private information on their intention of entering into retirement before the termination of the contract. When...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010790513

Subjective Evaluations: Discretionary Bonuses and Feedback Credibility

Fuchs, William - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013

We provide a new rationale for the use of discretionary bonuses. In a setting with unknown match qualities between a worker and a firm and subjective evaluations by the principal, bonuses are useful in order to make the feedback from the firm to the workers credible. This way workers in good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010720080

Optimal Use of Labor Market Policies: The Role of Job Search Assistance

Wunsch, Conny - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

This paper studies the role of job search assistance programs in optimal welfare-to-work programs. The analysis is based on a framework, that allows for endogenous choice of benefit types and levels, wage taxes or subsidies, and activation measures such as monitoring and job search assistance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008615438

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