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talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on performance pay and other high-powered incentives, thereby shifting effort … away from less easily contractible tasks such as long-term investments, risk management and within-firm cooperation. Under … distorts incentives downward in order to extract rents. More generally, as declining market frictions lead employers to compete …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635587
leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with nonintegration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … division managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do …We develop a theory of firm scope in which integrating two firms into one facilitates the allocation of resources, but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761852
divisions to replace high incentive pay to the division heads by incentives based on private benefits of control. In that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010632999
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal … tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an incentive effect from raising the winner's prize. However, we also … observed several empirical puzzles that appeared to contradict theory. Controlling for social preferences did not resolve the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646321
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727777
Several empirical studies have challenged tournament theory by pointing out that (1) there is considerable pay …-tier rents for creating incentives on tier 1. If workers are heterogeneous, the firm strictly improves the selection quality of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822027
We investigate a competitive labor market with team production. Workers differ in their motivation to exert team effort and types are private information. We show that there can exist a separating equilibrium in which workers self-select into different firms and firms employing cooperative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822981
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that there need not exist a competitive equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Building on their framework we demonstrate that externalities between agents − an agent's utility upon accepting a contract depends on the average type attracted by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976877
This study models producer protection legislation that would grant growers the right to claim damages (PPLD) if their contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes, PPLD...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005103260
We consider a labor market where the competitive search equilibrium is inefficient due to asymmetrical information. At the time when firms commit to specific hiring costs, workers hold private information on their intention of entering into retirement before the termination of the contract. When...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010790513