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Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories
Dickinson, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate the agent to raise his effort level whereas the “crowding-out” literature suggests that it may reduce the overall work effort. These two assertions are not necessarily contradictory provided that the nature of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763769
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Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?
Charness, Gary; Kuhn, Peter J. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
This paper surveys the contributions of laboratory experiments to labor economics. We begin with a discussion of methodological issues: why (and when) is a lab experiment the best approach; how do laboratory experiments compare to field experiments; and what are the main design issues? We then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568307
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Construction Contracts (or: "How to Get the Right Building at the Right Price?")
Chakravarty, Surajeet; MacLeod, W. Bentley - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
Most contracts that individuals enter into are not written from scratch; rather, they depend upon forms and terms that have been successful in the past. In this paper, we study the structure of form construction contracts published by the American Institute of Architects (AIA). We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233914
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How Unjust! An Experimental Investigation of Supervisors' Evaluation Errors and Agents' Incentives
Marchegiani, Lucia; Reggiani, Tommaso; Rizzolli, Matteo - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
In our simple model the supervisor: i) cannot observe the agent's effort; ii) aims at inducing the agent to exert high effort; but iii) can only offer rewards based on performance. Since performance is only stochastically related to effort, evaluation errors may occur. In particular, deserving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416946
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Performance Measurement, Expectancy and Agency Theory: An Experimental Study
Praag, Mirjam van; Sloof, Randolph - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007
Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent’s optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure. In contrast,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761969
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Performance Pay and Risk Aversion
Grund, Christian; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
A main prediction of agency theory is the well known risk-incentive trade-off. Incentive contracts should be found in environments with little uncertainty and for agents with low degrees of risk aversion. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the first trade-off. Due to lack of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822413
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Severance Pay and Corporate Finance: Empirical Evidence from a Panel of Austrian and Italian Firms
Cardinale, Mirko; Orszag, Mike - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
This paper examines the empirical link between severance pay and corporate finance. Severance pay is an economic debt of the employer and hence should be taken into account by the market in its assessments of risk. Using a hand collected dataset of accounting data from Italy and Austria we find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822359
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Risk, Uncertainty and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment
Koudstaal, Martin; Sloof, Randolph; Praag, Mirjam C. van - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
perform a large 'lab-in-the-field' experiment comparing entrepreneurs to managers – a suitable comparison group – and … employees (n = 2288). The results indicate that entrepreneurs perceive themselves as less risk averse than managers and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959844
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Unions and the Labor Market for Managers
DiNardo, John; Hallock, Kevin F.; Pischke, Jörn-Steffen - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2000
We examine the relationship between the employment and compensation of managers and CEOs and the presence of a … monitoring, which requires more managers. The model also assumes rent sharing between workers, managers and the owners of the … firm. Unions, by redistributing rents towards the workers, lead to lower employment and lower pay for managers. Using a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233814
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Female Managers and their Wages in Central Europe
Jurajda, Stepán; Paligorova, Teodora - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
based on a matching procedure. Only 7% of top-level Czech managers are women and their wages are about 20 percent lower even …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703646