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Severance Pay Mandates: Firing Costs, Hiring Costs, and Firm Avoidance Behaviors

Parsons, Donald O. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011

The potentially adverse labor market effects of severance pay mandates are a continuing source of policy concern. In a seminal study, Lazear (1990) found that contract avoidance of severance pay firing costs was theoretically simple – a bonding scheme would do – but that empirically the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225769

Producer Protection Legislation and Termination Damages in the Presence of Contracting Frictions

Wu, Steven Y. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

This study models producer protection legislation that would grant growers the right to claim damages (PPLD) if their contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes, PPLD...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005103260

Outside Income and Moral Hazard: The Elusive Quest for Good Politicians

Gagliarducci, Stefano; Nannicini, Tommaso; Naticchioni, … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the effort they exert in political life. If...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822047

A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care

Bolhaar, Jonneke; Lindeboom, Maarten; van der Klaauw, Bas - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822176

Health Care Reform and the Number of Doctor Visits - An Econometric Analysis

Winkelmann, Rainer - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2001

The paper evaluates the German health care reform of 1997, using the individual number of doctor visits as outcome measure. A new econometric model, the Probit-Poisson-log-normal model with correlated errors, describes the data better than existing count data models. Moreover, it has an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822340

Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers

Hairault, Jean-Olivier; Langot, François; Ménard, … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

This paper shows that optimal unemployment insurance contracts are age-dependent. Older workers have only a few years … present employment subsidies. Moreover, we propose adopting a global approach to unemployment insurance by determining an … optimal contract that integrates unemployment insurance and retirement pension systems. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822369

Division of Labour and Directed Production

Ratto, Marisa; Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822445

Legitimacy of Control

Schnedler, Wendelin; Vadovic, Radovan - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

What is the motivational effect of imposing a minimum effort requirement? Agents may no longer exert voluntary effort but merely meet the requirement. Here, we examine how such hidden costs of control change when control is considered legitimate. We study a principalagent model where control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822988

Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent Is Free to Leave

Englmaier, Florian; Muehlheusser, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557227

The Dilemma of Delegating Search: Budgeting in Public Employment Services

Addison, John T.; Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin; Kuhn, Thomas - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008564693