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Duque, Juan Carlos; Jetter, Michael; Sosa, Santiago - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

This paper argues that UN military interventions are geographically biased. For every 1,000 kilometers of distance from the three Western permanent UNSC members (France, UK, US), the probability of a UN military intervention decreases by 4 percent. We are able to rule out several alternative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010959603

Surviving the Turbulence Is Not Enough: Can Côte d'Ivoire Flourish Again?

Constant, Amelie F.; Tien, Bienvenue N. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011

Côte d'Ivoire is the world’s largest producer and exporter of cocoa beans, it accounts for 40% of the WAEMU's output, and 11% of its population are immigrant workers. Any political instability in the country will not only affect the domestic economy, but it will also affect the international...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294829

Could Education Promote the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process?

El-Attar, Mayssun - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

This paper explores Palestinians' attitudes towards a peace process and their determinants, with a particular focus on the role of education. Understanding the factors that shape attitudes towards peace is important in order to be successful in negotiations or in implementing a peace agreement....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008565195

Israel, the Palestinian Factions, and the Cycle of Violence

Jaeger, David A.; Paserman, M. Daniele - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

over a two-state solution to the conflict as well as the organizational structures of the factions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761886

Team Incentives: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment

Bandiera, Oriana; Barankay, Iwan; Rasul, Imran - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

productivity and composition of teams. Strengthening incentives, either through rankings or tournaments, makes workers more likely … to form teams with others of similar ability instead of with their friends. Introducing rank incentives however reduces … incentives only reduce the productivity of teams at the bottom of the productivity distribution, and monetary prize tournaments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009422064

Whom to Choose as a Team Mate? A Lab Experiment about In-Group Favouritism

Hammermann, Andrea; Mohnen, Alwine; Nieken, Petra - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

The practical relevance of favouritism among students of the same study path is evident in lifelong memberships in fraternities or sororities or in high donations to faculties. In our study, we focus on the in-group favouritism of students by examining the trade-off of acting based on in-group...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646320

Market Characteristics, Intra-Firm Coordination, and the Choice of Human Resource Management Systems: Evidence from New Japanese Data

Kato, Takao; Owan, Hideo - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

by Japanese firms (such as cross-functional offline teams and self-managed online teams). One novel finding (which is … consistent with the theory) is that the adoption of both self-managed online teams and cross-functional offline teams usually … arises in firms with shop-floor committees while the introduction of cross-functional offline teams alone often takes place …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703136

Strategic Mismatches in Competing Teams

Kräkel, Matthias - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 1999

This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the … formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703300

From Team Spirit to Jealousy: The Pitfalls of Too Much Transparency

Koch, Alexander K.; Morgenstern, Albrecht - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

Free riding in team production arises because individual effort is not perfectly observable. It seems natural to suppose that greater transparency would enhance incentives. Therefore, it is puzzling that team production often lacks transparency about individual contributions despite negligible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703696

The Effect of Intragroup Communication on Preference Shifts in Groups

Brady, Michael P.; Wu, Steven Y. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

We use a laboratory gift-exchange game to examine decisions made by groups under three different procedures that dictate how group members interact and reach decisions in comparison to individuals acting alone. We find that group decisions do deviate from those of individuals, but the direction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822671