Economic theory predicts that it is impossible to have cooperation in finitely repeated games such as a prisoner's dilemma game without communication. In an experiment on a voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good that is a version of a Hawk-Dove game, we obderved that...

Economic theory predicts that it is impossible to have cooperation in finitely repeated games such as a prisoner's dilemma game without communication. In an experiment on a voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good that is a version of a Hawk-Dove game, we obderved that...

This paper looks at the relationship between centralisation of the wage bargain and individual effort when the effort elicitation mechanism is provided by intra-firm, rather tha inter firm, wage differentials.

The paper examines the conventional wisdom that large buyers pay lower prices to suppliers than do small buyers. In the model, a supplier separately bargains with n buyers. The buyer's size is endogenous since they can merge prior to negotiations with the supplier.

The paper examines the conventional wisdom that large buyers pay lower prices to suppliers than do small buyers. In the model, a supplier separately bargains with n buyers. The buyer's size is endogenous since they can merge prior to negotiations with the supplier.

This paper looks at the relationship between centralisation of the wage bargain and individual effort when the effort elicitation mechanism is provided by intra-firm, rather tha inter firm, wage differentials.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate contract renegotiation in multi-agent situations where risk averse agents negotiate a contract offer to the principal after they observed a common, unverifiable perfect signal about their actions. Renegotiation gives the agents gains from mutual insurance.