A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents, in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. “Steeper†securities are better surplus extractors that narrow the gap...

We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to those who lose the auction. Firms’ bids are dual signals of their cost reductions: the winning bid signals the own cost reduction to rival oligopolists, whereas the losing...

The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning bid and stressed that this gives firms an incentive to signal strength through their bids, to the benefit of the innovator. In the present paper we examine whether revealing...

The paper assumes a product design around modular architectures and discusses the suitability of the principle of delayed product differentiation in assemble-to-order environments. We demonstrate that this principle does not enable one to make optimal decisions concerning how variety should...

Assemble-to-order refers to a supply chain strategy in which products are not assembled until customer order arrives. It is based on the so-called form postponement that is to hold components at a generic form and to delay the point of product differentiation. The performance of an...