A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents, in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. “Steeper†securities are better surplus extractors that narrow the gap...

We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to those who lose the auction. Firms’ bids are dual signals of their cost reductions: the winning bid signals the own cost reduction to rival oligopolists, whereas the losing...

The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning bid and stressed that this gives firms an incentive to signal strength through their bids, to the benefit of the innovator. In the present paper we examine whether revealing...

In this paper we consider the classical newsvendor model with profit maximization. When demand is fully observed in each period and follows either the Rayleigh or the exponential distribution, appropriate estimators for the optimal order quantity and the maximum expected profit are established...

This paper considers the classical Newsvendor model, also known as the Newsboy problem, with the demand to be fully observed and to follow in successive inventory cycles one of the Exponential, Rayleigh, and Log-Normal distributions. For each distribution, appropriate estimators for the optimal...

This paper considers the classical newsvendor model when, (a) demand is autocorrelated, (b) the parameters of the marginal distribution of demand are unknown, and (c) historical data for demand are available for a sample of successive periods. An estimator for the optimal order quantity is...