Green certificates are the main instrument for promoting renewable electricity (RES-E) in Sweden. But certificates cover only a limited share of total RES-E production. Under partial coverage, crowding out may arise whereby costly new RES-E replaces inexpensive old RES-E. Granting certificates...

Pollution and polluters can move across national boundaries, but governments which seek to maximize social welfare should coordinate optimal environmental protection through transfer payments or commitments. However, governments may respond to political pressure rather than maximize social...

We study the extent to which people are misinformed about their relative position in the income distribution and the effects on preferences for redistribution of correcting faulty beliefs. We implement a tailor-made survey in Sweden and document that a vast majority of Swedes believe that they...

The analysis provides a new explanation for two widespread problems concerning European unemployment policy: the disappointingly small effect of many past reform measures on unemployment, and the political difficulties in implementing more extensive reform programs. We argue that the heart of...

The analysis provides a new explanation for two widespread problems concerning European unemployment policy: the Disappointingly small effect of many past reform measures on unemployment, and the political difficulties in implementing more extensive reform programs.

An "incentive subsidy" policy for subsidizing private R & D is proposed that can be more efficient, from a social point of view, than subsidy policies in common use such as a "normal" subsidy policy (fixed amount granted at project start), and conditional loans (loan is repaid only if project is...

Government subsidized industrial R & D stands for a large and increasing segment of the total R & D conducted. Yet very little is known about the effectiveness of such subsidies. This paper summarizes the empirical literature concerning direct project subsidies, tax credits, and support for...

We conduct a laboratory experiment where third-party spectators can redistribute resources between two agents, thereby offsetting the consequences of controllable and uncontrollable luck. Some spectators go to the limits and equalize all or no inequalities, but many follow an interior allocation...