Showing 1 - 10 of 18
We analyse symmetric coordination games à la Bryant (1983) where a number of players simultaneously choose efforts from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645381
When firms possess unique R & D assets such as ideas or particular researchers, and there are aggregate increasing returns to scale in R & D, then there can be several Nash equilibria involving different levels of investment in R & D. However when costless communication is possible firms may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818400
for quantal response models in game theory.  …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771086
No abstract.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010611601
We survey the literature on social networks by putting together the economics, sociological and physics/applied mathematics approaches, showing their similarities and differences. We expose, in particular, the two main ways of modeling network formation. While the physics/applied mathematics...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008502564
In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190635
the set of neutrally stable outcomes in finite cheap-talk 2x2 coordination games. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005639287
In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational indivudals are recurrently matched to play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply tthe myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005639310
of a system of ordinary differential equations of the type studied in evolutionary game theory. We establish precise …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005639325
This paper analyses the behaviour of competing governments in the EC with respect to inflows of direct investment. Solving a non-cooperative sequential bargaining game in which host countries gain from direct investment through tax revenue or imposition of forced local subcontracting, it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010685027