Showing 1 - 8 of 8
Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082492
framework of non-cooperative game theory. Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategic behaviour with respect to … economic theory has lead to new predictions and opened up doors to other social sciences. The discussion will be focused on the … in evolutionary game theory so far? What are the next challenges for evolutionary game theory in economics? …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771089
In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190635
Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model these mutation rates as endogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645419
This paper analyses the behaviour of competing governments in the EC with respect to inflows of direct investment. Solving a non-cooperative sequential bargaining game in which host countries gain from direct investment through tax revenue or imposition of forced local subcontracting, it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010685027
No abstract.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818312
No abstract.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818361
No abstract.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818502