Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as...

No abstract.

Evolutionary theorizing has a long tradition in economics. Only recently has this approach been brought into the framework of non-cooperative game theory. Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategic behaviour with respect to evolutionary forces in the context of games played...

We survey the literature on social networks by putting together the economics, sociological and physics/applied mathematics approaches, showing their similarities and differences. We expose, in particular, the two main ways of modeling network formation. While the physics/applied mathematics...

In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational...

This paper provides deterministic approximation results for stochastic processes that arise when finite populations recurrently play finite games. The deterministic approximation is defined in continuous time as a system of ordinary differential equations of the type studied in evolutionary game...

This paper examines equilibrioum and stability in symmetric two-player cheap-talk games. In particular, we characterize the set of neutrally stable outcomes in finite cheap-talk 2x2 coordination games.

In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational indivudals are recurrently matched to play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply tthe myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably...

This paper provides deterministic approximation results for stochastic processes that arise when finite populations of boundedly rational agents recurrently play finite games. The deterministic approximation is defined in continuous time in terms of a system of ordinary differential equations of...

Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient...