discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. We extend these results to the case … number of steps, maximal collusion is attained with simple price-quantity strategies exhibiting capacity withholding. …This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price …

capacity constrained producers. …

In most wholesale electricity markets generators must submit step-function offers of supply to a uniform price auction …

This paper characterizes the Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid (discriminatory), divisible-good, procurement auction …’s demand exceeds suppliers’ capacity with a positive probability. The derived equilibrium can be used to model strategic …-ups of the derived equilibrium are compared to results for the SFE of a uniform-price auction. …

factor potentially leading to collusion. We show that forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce … mergers leading to asymmetric market structures with higher risk of collusion, when firms face indivisible costs of collusion …) firm benefits sufficiently more from collusion when industry asymmetries increase, collusion can become more likely when …

oligopoly model with an "endogenous valuations" auction model. Thereby, I take into account that, in an oligopoly, a firm …

-good/multi-unit auctions provides guidance on the design of the auction format; setting the reservation price; the rationing rule; and …