Entry of large ("big-box") stores along with a drastic fall in the number of stores are striking trends in retail. We use a dynamic model to measure the impact of large entrants on productivity, allowing for a controlled productivity process and accounting for prices, local markets, and the...

In most wholesale electricity markets generators must submit step-function offers of supply to a uniform price auction, and the market is cleared at the price of the most expensive offer needed to meet realised demand. Such markets can most elegantly be modelled as the pure-strategy, Nash...

This paper characterizes the Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid (discriminatory), divisible-good, procurement auction. Demand by the auctioneer is uncertain as in the supply function equilibrium model. A closed form expression is derived. Existence of an equilibrium is ensured if the hazard rate...

A government wanting to promote an efficient allocation of resources as measured by the total surplus, should strategically delegate to its competition authority a welfare standard with a bias in favour of consumers. A consumer bias means that some welfare increasing mergers will be blocked....

We use a dynamic oligopoly model of entry and exit to evaluate how entry regulations affect profitability and market structure in retail. The model incorporates demand and store-level heterogeneity. Based on unique data for all retail food stores in Sweden, we find that the average entry costs...

A Quality-adjusted specification of labor is suggested which allow firms training to effect labor efficiency. To assess the cost and productivity effects, this specification is integrated into a flexible neoclassical cost function.

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