What explains the world-wide trend of pro-entrepreneurial policies in the last few decades? We study entrepreneurial policy in a lobbying model taking into account the con.ict of interest between entrepreneurs and incumbents. It is shown that international market integration leads to more...

We examine the effect of corruption on foreign direct investments. Our model shows that corruption may have different effects on investments aimed at selling to a local market, in comparison to investments aimed at selling from the corrupt market. Using Swedish firm-level data, we find that...

In this paper, we use data from a corruption survey conducted among top politicians and high level civil servants in 290 Swedish municipalities in 2007 to investigate the effects of government size on corruption. We construct several measures of corruption based on the survey, and combine these...

We demonstrate how suppliers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, suppliers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete with supply functions. In equilibrium firms sell forward contracts and buy call...

No abstract.

This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments....

This paper examines equilibrioum and stability in symmetric two-player cheap-talk games. In particular, we characterize the set of neutrally stable outcomes in finite cheap-talk 2x2 coordination games.

In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational indivudals are recurrently matched to play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply tthe myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably...

Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient...

No abstract.