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Direct Investment and Local Content Rules in the European Community
Andersson, Thomas - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1990
This paper analyses the behaviour of competing governments in the EC with respect to inflows of direct investment …. Solving a non-cooperative sequential bargaining game in which host countries gain from direct investment through tax revenue … discrimination of direct investment. As they bid against each other for the attraction of projects, the EC countries will give away …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010685027
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Exclusive Quality - Why Exclusive Distribution may Benefit the TV-viewers
Stennek, Johan - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2007
Sports organizations, Hollywood studios and TV channels grant satellite and cable networks exclusive rights to televise their matches, movies and media contents. Exclusive distribution prevents viewers from watching attractive programs, and reduces the TV-distributors incentives to compete in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419550
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Bargaining over a New Welfare State
Bonatti, Alessandro; Thomsson, Kaj - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2007
The goal of this paper is twofold: First, to develop an estimable model of legislative politics in the US Congress, second, to provide a greater understanding of the objectives behind the New Deal. In the theoretical model, the distribution of federal funds across regions of the country is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207057
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The Insider's Dilemma: An Experiment on Merger Formation.
Lindqvist, T.; Stennek, J. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2001
This paper tests the insiders' dilemma hypothesis in a laboratory experiment. The insiders' dilemma means that a profitable merger does not occur, because it is even more profitable for each firm to unilaterally stand as an outsider (Kamien and Zang, 1990 and 1993). The experimental data...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005780368
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Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model
Weibull, Jörgen W.; Saez-Marti, Maria - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1998
In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190635
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Why Mergers Reduce Profits, and Raise Share Prices.
Fridolfsson, S.-O.; Stennek, J. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1999
We demonstrate a "preemptive merger mechanism" which may explain the empirical puzzle why mergers reduce profits, and raise share prices. A merger may confer strong negative externalities on the firms outside the merger. If being an "insider" is better than being an "outsider", firms may merge...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005486503
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Why Mergers Reduce Profits, and Raise Share Prices
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Stennek, Johan - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1999
We demonstrate a "preemptive merger mechanism" which may explain the empirical puzzle why mergers reduce profits, and raise share prices. A merger may confer strong negative externalilties on the firms outside the merger. If being an "insider" is better than being an "outsider", firms may merge...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419544
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Should Mergers be Controlled?.
Fridolfsson, S.-O.; Stennek, J. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2000
Anticompetitive mergers benefit competitors more than the merging firms. We show that such externalities reduce firms' incentives to merge (a holdup mechanism). Firms delay merger proposals, thereby foregoing valuable profits and hoping other firms will merge instead - a war of attrition. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005639334
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Should Mergers be Controlled?
Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Stennek, Johan - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2000
Anticompetitive mergers benefit competitors more than the merging firms. We show that such externalities reduce firms' incentives to merge (a holdup mechanism). Firms delay merger proposals, thereby foregoing valuable profits and hoping other firms will merge instead - a war of attrition. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645389
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The Insiders' Dilemma: An Experiment on Merger Formation
Lindqvist, Tobias; Stennek, Johan - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2001
This paper tests the insiders' dilemma hypothesis in a laboratory experiment. The insiders' dilemma means that a profitable merger does not occur, because it is even more profitable for each firm to unilaterally stand as an outsider (Kamien and Zang, 1990 and 1993). The experimental data...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645424