generalizes the traditional IO approach, employing ideas on coalition-formation from cooperative game theory. The model suggests …

This paper evaluates the welfare consequences of the failing firm doctrine in the EU and US merger laws. I combine an … oligopoly model with an "endogenous valuations" auction model. Thereby, I take into account that, in an oligopoly, a firm …

unprofitable and anti-competitive merger, when alternative mergers are profitable and pro-competitive. …

This paper evaluates the welfare consequences of the failing firm doctrine in the EU and US merger laws. I combine an … oligopoly model with an "endogenous valuations" auction model. Thereby, I take into account that, in an oligopoly, a firm …

auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price …

outsider firm and acquiring an outsider-toehold is thus a signal of an anti-competitive merger. …

positive externality on the outsider (competing) firm when a merger occurs. The purposes of this paper are to empirically …

, consequently, the relevance of simple "checklists" in merger control can be questioned. …

rather than exogenous merger theory. More surprisingly, our data suggests that fairness considerations also make profitable … profitable merger does not occur, because it is even more profitable for each firm to unilaterally stand as an outsider (Kamien …

that some welfare increasing mergers will be blocked. This is optimal, if the relevant alternative to the merger is another …