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Bjornerstedt, J.; Stennek, J. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2001

In many intermediate goods markets buyers and sellers both have market power. Contracts are usually long-term and negotiated bilaterally, codifying many elements in addition to price. We model such bilateral oligopolies as a set of simultaneous Rubenstein-Stahl bargainings over contracts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005670108

Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: An Experiment

Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2008

: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels …. With rewards, cartels are reported systematically and prices finally fall. If a ringleader is excluded from leniency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419507

The Insider's Dilemma: An Experiment on Merger Formation.

Lindqvist, T.; Stennek, J. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2001

This paper tests the insiders' dilemma hypothesis in a laboratory experiment. The insiders' dilemma means that a profitable merger does not occur, because it is even more profitable for each firm to unilaterally stand as an outsider (Kamien and Zang, 1990 and 1993). The experimental data...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005780368

Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication

Mouraviev, Igor - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2006

The paper studies the role of communication in facilitating collusion. The situation of infinitely repeated Cournot … collusive output levels or a 'downward' demand shock. The firms choose between tacit collusion and collusion with communication …. Communication implies that the firms meet and exchange information about past outputs and is assumed to be the only legal proof of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645357

Credible Communication and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Multi-stage Games

Andersson, Ola; Wengström, Erik - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2011

It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication … can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for … investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. More specifically, two treatments are considered: one …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323348

Efficiency Gains from Mergers.

Roller, L.-H.; Stennek, J.; Verboven, F. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2000

The purpose of this report is to contribute to the analysis of two questions. Should a merger control system take into account efficiency gains from horizontal mergers, and balance these gains against the anti-competitive effects of mergers? If so, how should a system be designed to account for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005670112

Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games

Weibull, J.W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1997

Evolutionary game theory studies the robustness of strategy profiles and sets of strategy profiles with respect to evolutionary forces in games played repeatedly in large populations of boundedly rational agents. The approach is macro oriented inthe sense of focusing on the strategy distribution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005486499

Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap Talk Games.

Banerjee, A.; Weibull, J.W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1996

This paper examines equilibrioum and stability in symmetric two-player cheap-talk games. In particular, we characterize the set of neutrally stable outcomes in finite cheap-talk 2x2 coordination games.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005639287

Endogenous Mergers in Concentrated Markets

Persson, Lars; Horn, Henrik - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1998

This paper proposes an approach for predicting the pattern of mergers when different mergers are feasible. It generalizes the traditional IO approach, employing ideas on coalition-formation from cooperative game theory. The model suggests that in concentrated markets, mergers are conductive to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419495

The Auctioning of a Failing Firm

Persson, Lars - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1998

This paper evaluates the welfare consequences of the failing firm doctrine in the EU and US merger laws. I combine an oligopoly model with an "endogenous valuations" auction model. Thereby, I take into account that, in an oligopoly, a firm's willingness to pay for the assets depends on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419522