The theory of the firm suggests that firms can respond to poor contract enforcement by vertically integrating their production process. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether firms' integration opportunities affect the way institutions determine international trade patterns. We find...

The theory of the firm suggests that firms can respond to poor contract enforcement by vertically integrating their production process. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether firms’ integration opportunities affect the way contract enforcement institutions determine international...

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This paper questions whether competition can replace sector-specific regulation of mobile telecommunications. We show that the monopolistic outcome prevails independently of market concentration when access prices are determined in bilateral negotiations. A light-handed regulatory policy can...

We analyse network competition in a market with international calls. National regulatory agencies (NRAs) have incentives to set regulated termination rates above marginal cost to extract rent from international call termination. International network ownership and deregulation are alternatives...

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