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Noisy Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games

Ganslandt, Mattias; Carlsson, Hans - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1997

We analyse symmetric coordination games à la Bryant (1983) where a number of players simultaneously choose efforts from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645381

Firms' Choice of R&D Intensity in the Presence of Aggregate Increasing Returns to Scale

Fölster, Stefan - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1989

. However when costless communication is possible firms may be able to coordinate a move towards a pareto-preferred equilibrium … provided that the communication is credible. It is shown that in some cases when firms do not move to a pareto …-preferred equilibrium in spite of communication one firm may have an incentive to purchase R & D assets from other firms to reap the gain …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818400

Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty

Andersson, Ola; Argenton, Cédric; Weibull, Jörgen W. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2012

In games with continuum strategy sets, we model a player’s uncertainty about another player’s strategy, as an atomless probability distribution over the other player’s strategy set. We call a strategy profile (strictly) robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010539859

Mixed Strategies in Discriminatory Divisible-good Auctions

Anderson, Edward J.; Holmberg, Pär; Philpott, Andrew B. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2009

Author: Edward J. Anderson, Pär Holmberg and Andrew B. Philpott Keywords: Pay-as-bid Auction; Divisible Good Auction; Mixed Strategy Equilibria; Wholesale Electricity Markets Pages: 71 Published: November 24, 2009 JEL-codes: D43; D44; C72 Download Wp814.pdf (756 kB) Abstract Using the concept of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008491695

Game-theoretical, Strategic forward Contracting in the Electricity Market

Holmberg, Pär - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2008

Forward sales is a credible commitment to aggressive spot market bidding, and it mitigates producers’ market power in electricity markets. Still it can be profitable for a producer to make such a commitment if it results in a soft response from competitors in the spot market (strategies are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645406

Supply Function Equilibria in Networks with Transport Constraints

Holmberg, Pär; Philpott, Andrew - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2012

Transport constraints limit competition and arbitrageurs' possibilities of exploiting price differences between goods in neighbouring markets, especially when storage capacity is negligible. We analyse this in markets where strategic producers compete with supply functions, as in wholesale...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818454

Credible Communication and Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Multi-stage Games

Andersson, Ola; Wengström, Erik - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2011

It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication … can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for … investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. More specifically, two treatments are considered: one …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009323348

Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: An Experiment

Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2008

This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419507

Supply Function Equilibria: Step Functions and Continuous Representations

Holmberg, Pär; Newbery, David; Ralph, Daniel - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2009

In most wholesale electricity markets generators must submit step-function offers of supply to a uniform price auction, and the market is cleared at the price of the most expensive offer needed to meet realised demand. Such markets can most elegantly be modelled as the pure-strategy, Nash...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005025457

Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid Auctions

Holmberg, Pär - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2009

This paper characterizes the Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid (discriminatory), divisible-good, procurement auction. Demand by the auctioneer is uncertain as in the supply function equilibrium model. A closed form expression is derived. Existence of an equilibrium is ensured if the hazard rate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005025460